This paper estimates what characteristics (e.g. location, number of casualties, and type of attack) are associated with an Islamic terrorist attack. This is established by identifying the significant determinants of the probability that an attack had been carried out by Islamic terrorists. For Europe, the United States, and Canada, the analysis employs ITERATE data from October 1979 to December 2002 to ascertain the significant characteristics of Islamic terrorist attacks. A random-parameter logit model is used to analyze the probability of such attacks, taking into account the heterogeneity of the sample data. This model outperforms the standard logit model. Some policy implications are presented.
INTRODUCTION
Western societies in the early years of the twenty-first century must confront complex and multi-dimensional social, political, economic and cultural factors, which require extensive research in various disciplines, if they are to approach an understanding of why radical Islamic terrorism has proliferated across the world. The growth trend in radical Islamic terrorism, which reached an unprecedented scale on September 11 2001, more or less coincides with the dwindling of Communist state-sponsored and other leftist terrorism.
Radical Islamic terrorism is, in its aim, similar to the terrorism which was common in Europe during the 1970s, in as much as one of its goals is the destruction of the capitalist system (Richards, 2003) . The evolutionary pattern means that there is a variation in the acts of terrorism along the time, whilst under the definition of terrorist events, there are different types of political demands (Donno and Russett, 2004) . 2004 (bombing rush-hour commuter trains); second, the consequent scale of victimization achievable and achieved by such methods, combined with the threat of obtaining and using methods that would wreak even greater indiscriminate carnage on civilian populations; and lastly, the escalating dangers of the social, economic, political and even psychological impacts on the continuing viability of the capitalist system and way of life, implied by the failure to prevent such attacks.
The paper contributes to the theme's literature in five ways. First, it uses the randomparameters logit model (RPL), previously used by Train (1998) and Revelt and Train (1998) , which allows for heterogeneity in the data set. Second, it specifically analyzes radical Islamic terrorist events, an issue that so far has not inspired much research in Europe, despite its contemporary importance. Third, it analyzes terrorist events on both sides of the Atlantic, which are tied by the same market system as well as the same threat. Fourth, it uses panel data, whereas time-series analysis is usually used. Lastly, it investigates the targeting of United States citizens outside the USA, a phenomenon linked to Islamic terrorism, and which has not attracted research so far.
The paper regresses the probability of a terrorist attack being perpetrated by an extremist Islamic organization on its characteristics, using a mixed logit. The model permits the identification of significant statistical characteristics that estimate the probability of a terrorist attack to be Islamic, as opposed to a non-Islamic. The value of such research is that it could contribute to policy formulation in the war against terrorism. If one knew the characteristics identifying Islamic events, then one could better allocate resources used in countering such events.
The paper is organized as follows: in the second section, we briefly describe the contextual setting and its antecedents; in section 3, the existing literature is surveyed; in section 4, we present the mixed logit model; in section 5, we present the theoretical framework; in section 6, the data is set out and the results presented; and finally, in section 7, we give our conclusions.
TERRORISM IN EUROPE, THE USA AND CANADA
The character and motivation of the first terrorist groups to emerge in the Middle East in the late-1960s were political, rather than religious; that is, Marxist, anti-western and anticapitalist. They were secular, revolutionary movements, a minority of the tendency proliferating amongst young, extreme left-wing intellectuals and the disaffected globally, against the background of ideological conflict and confrontation of the Cold War, most ostensibly present in the US involvement in Vietnam. They found sponsorship in states such as the Soviet Union and certain Arab countries.
Radical Palestinians began to internationalize and urbanize their conflict with aerial hijackings, kidnappings, bombings and assassinations, involving western civilians for the first time.
Two major events of 1979, the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, were to determine, in the short and long terms, an evolution from secularist, [2000] [2001] [2002] , the rate of radical Islamic terrorism for the USA increases dramatically to 67%, corresponding to 6 events out of the total of 9. This pattern is also registered by Italy, where the proportion of Islamic terrorism increases to 83%, but this figure should be analyzed with caution in view of the small number of terrorist events occurring in this country during the period analyzed. Other countries display some or no terrorist events at all in the same period.
The total number of US victims varies from country to country, as does the number of France and Greece have the highest percentage of terrorist attacks using bombs, 61%, 57%, 51% and 49% respectively, while the UK, Germany and Greece are the countries in which the rate of the arson type of attacks is greatest, 26.1%, 22.5% and 18.9% respectively.
Assassination has a higher share in Canada, Belgium and Austria, with rates of 19.2%, 18.1% and 15.3% respectively.
LITERATURE SURVEY
The economics literature on terrorism is restricted both in terms of the number of papers and the number of authors (for a relatively up-to-date survey, see Enders and Sandler, 1995) .
Two main types of analyses are in evidence: time series models and cross-section or panel data models. Papers in the time series tradition use intervention analysis, in which the number of terrorist incidents is regressed on indicators of policy intervention, to evaluate the effectiveness of policy (Enders and Sandler, 1993) . Alternatively, time series models use economic-impact analysis, in which the foreign direct investment is regressed on terrorist incidents to evaluate the economic impact of terrorism on the economic variables (Enders and Sandler, 1996) . Enders and Sandler (1991) used a VAR (vector auto-regression) first-order to estimate the economic impact of terrorism on tourism in Spain during the period from 1970 to 1988. Enders (1995, pp. 316-320 ) presents a pedagogical review of the previous paper. Enders, Sandler, and Parise (1992) analyzed the economic impact of terrorism on tourism receipts, using quarterly data for 12 countries from 1970:I to 1988:IV with a transfer function. Enders and Sandler (1996) analyzed the economic impact of terrorist actions on foreign direct investment in Spain and Greece with quarterly data from 1975:I to 1991:IV for Spain and 1976:I to 1991:IV for Greece. They concluded that an average year of terrorism led to a persistent, negative impact on foreign direct investment of 13.5% for Spain. For Greece, this annual negative impact on foreign direct investment was 11.9%. Drakos and Kutan (2003) analyzed the impact of terrorism in three countries: Greece, Turkey and Israel, with a simultaneous equation model, concluding that the tourism industry is sensitive to terrorist attacks. Sloboda (2003) assessed the effects of terrorism on tourism with yearly data from 1988 to 2001 for the USA by an ARMAX model, allowing for a trend and unit roots in the data. Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) analyzed the economic impact of ETA terrorism on GDP, concluding that there was a 10% average gap between per-capita GDP in the Basque
Country and the per-capita GDP of a comparable synthetic region that does not suffer from terrorism. Moreover, on analyzing Basque market-listed companies in comparison with nonBasque listed companies, they concluded that the former show a negative performance as an externality of terrorism.
Time series analysis is also used to analyze generic characteristics of terrorist attacks. Enders and Sandler (2002) analyzed the pattern of transnational terrorism with a Fourrier model. Another paper employs time-series data with the aim of forecasting the future evolution of terrorist incidents (Enders and Sandler, 2002 ).
Papers employing cross-section and panel data are less common and include Atkinson et al. (1987) , who examined the impact of changes in the negotiating environment on the length and severity of terrorist attacks and Li and Schaub (2004) , who analyze the relationship between economic globalization and transnational terrorism, using a negative binomial regression for a sample of 112 countries from 1975 to 1997. Blomberg et al. (2002) analyze the importance of standard economic variables such as per-capita GDP growth and investment in determining the onset and intensity of terrorist attacks for a sample of 127 countries from 1968 to 1991, using a Markov model.
From this literature survey, we can observe that the results are focused on the implications of terrorism on specific economic variables. Concerning the econometric methodology employed, time-series dynamics and related issues, such as causality tests and trend breaks on terrorism events, are well understood. However, heterogeneity in the observed variable, spatial dispersion of the data and other issues related to cross-section data on terrorist attacks are less understood. In this paper, we enlarge on previous research by seeking the determinants of the likelihood of an Islamic attack, allowing for the heterogeneity inherent in the terrorist behavior and investigating the particular dispersion of the attacks by country. As far as we know, no other paper has estimated either the determinants of Islamic terrorist attacks, or the heterogeneity in terrorism variables.
MIXED LOGIT
With the characteristics of an attack denoted by the vector , the probability that the attack with characteristics was instigated by Islamic terrorists as opposed to non-Islamic terrorists is denoted by
with β a vector of unknown parameters. This probability is assumed to be logit and is equal to, 
The logit is a highly popular model with regard to dealing with binary outcomes. Mcfadden (1974) , Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985) and Train (1986) used the logit model to relate the probability of making a choice to a set of variables reflecting decision-maker preferences. The logit is usually used as a behavioral model. In the present paper, we use the model in a slightly different approach, which is statistical, rather than behavioral. We estimate the probability of a terrorist event being carried out by an Islamic terrorist group, given a set of characteristics of the event, that is, we estimate Prob(Islamic⎪type), where type includes the particular attributes of the event. A behavioral approach to this problem would be Prob (type ⎪Islamic), but the data set used does not allow for the estimation of such a
model.
An alternative model is the random parameters logit (RPL) (also called mixed logit), which relaxes the assumption that the coefficients are the same for all terrorist events, allowing for some heterogeneity in the way the attack's characteristics determine the probability of it being carried out by an Islamic group. Therefore, this model is more flexible than the standard logit and tests can be applied to determine whether this extra flexibility is needed in order to fit the data.
For the RPL model, an event i's coefficient on some characteristic j, , ji β is a random draw from some distribution where the family of the distribution is specified, but the mean and variance are unknown and have to be estimated. We consider
is symmetric, it is usually considered to be the normal, and less often, the uniform or triangular distribution. If, for example, the coefficient can only assume positive values with asymmetric distribution, ) (• F is usually lognormal. The RPL probability of a radical Islamic terrorist attack is the integral of the standard logit probability in (1) over the density of the parameters,
The model estimates the coefficients mean, µ , and the covariance between them, Ω .
Exact maximum-likelihood estimation is not possible, since the integral cannot be calculated analytically and requires simulation. Recently developed techniques for simulating probabilities (Train, 2003) have made it feasible to estimate such models. Applications include Train (1998), Revelt and Train (1998) , Mcfadden and Train (2000) and Rouwendal and Meijer (2001) . Observe that P i is the expectation of, ) , ( . These draws can be obtained randomly using a pseudo-random generator but more recently, systematic methods, such as Halton draws, have proved to be more efficient (see Train (2003) for further details).
The simulated probability is:
where is the 
which depends on µ and Ω. The maximum-likelihood estimates of those parameters (given their chosen initial values) are obtained with iterative numerical optimization procedures (see Train (2003) and Hensher and Greene (2003) for further explanations). Additionally, we remark that the mixed logit allows for heteroskedasticity in the error term, depending on the explanatory variables. Therefore we conclude that the mixed logit is more flexible than standard logit, and tests can be applied to determine whether the extra flexibility is needed for fitting the data. We adopt the definition of Enders and Sandler (2004) : " terrorism is the premeditated use or threat of use of violence by individuals or sub-national groups to obtain a political or social objective through intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the immediate victims". On the basis of this definition, we estimate the above-mentioned probability for event i as, 
EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK
We chose the variables from the ITERATE data set, on the basis of their availability.
Here Islamic is a dummy variable, equal to one whenever the attack was performed by radical Islamic terrorists. ITERATE does not specify radical Islamic attacks, but identifies the first group initiating the action. From the list, we have chosen the Islamic groups. Some of this plethora of Islamic groups may not be radical in their nature, but since we are considering terrorism in Europe, the USA and Canada, we assume that almost all Islamic groups perpetrating terrorist attacks in the western countries are radical. We have excluded, for instance, the PKK (Kurdish People's Liberation Front), in view of its well-known secular nature. In the Appendix to this paper, we include the list of the groups appearing in our data that we consider to be radical Islamic. There are some terrorist events in the ITERATE data set committed by unknown groups (24%). In such cases, we have considered these terrorist events to be non-Islamic, since they are more probable than the Islamic. However, this procedure may introduce some contamination into the model. Casualties is a continuous variable which results from adding together wounded and killed, identified by ITERATE respectively as the number of individuals wounded and the number of individuals killed. These two variables are highly correlated (with correlation coefficient equal to 0.97), so that when we introduced both into the model, only wounded is statistically significant. Therefore, we decided to combine the information of both variables by considering the number of casualties instead. We have also considered the number of US citizen victims outside the USA (US vics out US), in order to take into account the targeting of the USA claimed by radical Islamic terrorist groups.
Fran, Ital, Ger, Switz, UK and US are dummy variables representing the country where the event took place, based on ITERATE's identification of the end location of the terrorist event. ITERATE identifies the starting and ending locations. For roughly 98% of the events, the starting and ending location of a particular event are identical. Differences in starting and ending locations result from hijacking, which was not statistically significant in the previous analysis and therefore, is not an explanatory variable in our model. In a previous analysis, we also considered Spain, but in all of the models that we applied, this was not a statistically significant variable. The chosen countries are based on their being considered as representative of western society in terms of dimension and political involvement in international affairs. Furthermore, these are the western countries, except for Greece, with a higher annual average incidence of terrorism events in the period (Blomberg et. al., 2002) .
Switzerland was included due to its high rate of Islamic terrorist attacks.
Intervention variables were not taken into account, because it is not clear what these are for this type of event. The relative level of terrorist activities depends on three factors:
The relative costs between legal and illegal activities, the relative gains between the two types of activities, and the total resources available. Efforts to curb the funding of radical Islamic terrorist groups are not documented, thus preventing the definition of this variable.
Other traditional intervention variables, such as the introduction of metal detectors in airports,
are not specific to this type of terrorism and merely cause substitution among various modes of operation (Enders and Sandler, 1993) . The main modes of intervention deployed against radical Islamic groups are preemption and deterrence, applied through the intelligence and security agencies, together with the usual procedures applied to counter organized crime. A further reason for not considering additional variables is because the ITERATE data set is established on a daily basis and consequently, will display very small variations within this type of sample. The above-mentioned potentially exogenous variables are not available on this basis. If we aggregated the data set to introduce additional variables, we would then have count data of radical Islamic events, which would preclude the use of the mixed logit model.
The non-consideration of preemption and deterrence variables may induce the omitted variable bias in our model, if these politics have determinant different consequences on
Islamic terrorists opposed to non-Islamic. On the other hand, preemption and deterrence may influence mainly the type of attack, and therefore, indirectly, they are considered in the model.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Time series data on terrorist incidents is found in the ITERATE data base from 1968 to 2002, available from Mickolus (edwardmickolus@hotmail.com). We restricted the data span to the period October 1979 to December 2002. The initial data frame is based on Enders and Sandler (2000), who established that the rise of fundamentalist terrorism started in the fourth quarter of 1979. The final period is defined by the availability of the data. We gathered a total of 2,799 observations. Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the data.
We verify that most of the data set comprises dummy variables, with two continuous variables: casualties and US victims out of US. We present a standard logit model and the mixed model for comparative purposes.
As we have previously mentioned, Spain was not statistically significant in any of the models used, thus it was eliminated from our analysis. Focusing on the adequacy of the standard logit model, we implemented the RESET test. The result gives evidence of misspecification of the logit model. This may be due to the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, depending on the aforementioned explanatory variables. We applied the HAL test of Chesher and Santos-Silva (2002) , using likelihood ratio procedures to test against this type of heterogeneity. First, we considered that it was dependent on all the explanatory 2 http:/elsa.berkeley.edu/~train/Ps.html.
variables. Next, we applied a classic selection procedure. The results display evidence of unobserved heterogeneity depending on Bomb, Casualties, and Switzerland, inducing the estimation of a mixed logit with random coefficients for these variables. However, the hypothesis that Bomb and Switzerland have a random coefficient was rejected and consequently, we considered Casualties to be the only source of random effects. The final results can be seen in Table 4 . Taking into account the mixed logit, the probability of an attack being Islamic increases if the attack results in assassination. Furthermore, terrorist attacks taking place in France, Italy and Switzerland have a higher probability of being Islamic, whereas for those in the UK and the USA, this does not appear to be the case. On the other hand, attacks that are armed, or involve bombs or arson have a lower probability of being Islamic. While the number of US victims and the number of resulting casualties were statistically significant for the standard logit, for the mixed model they were not. Nevertheless, we can not reject the possibility that casualties has a random coefficient (with estimated standard deviation equal to 1.21), neither can we reject the possibility that the average of the coefficients in the population is zero. This signifies that for half of the events, the coefficient is positive and for the other half, it is negative.
Comparing the standard logit with the respective mixed logit by means of an LR test, we obtain a test statistic with p-values equal to 0.00, denoting that the mixed logit is the more appropriate specification.
The fact that a parameter is random, opposed to non-random means that the effect of this variable has a widespread variance, signifying that it varies greatly along the sample.
Therefore, there are terrorist events with few casualties that have a high probability of being Islamic and an equally high probability of this origin for others with many casualties.
Confronted with this result, the non-random results are more predictable, and when it is said that the UK has a negative probability of experiencing a radical Islamic attack, this signifies that Islamic terrorist acts are less likely to happen in the UK, due to deterrence enforcement, or because Islamic terrorists do not target this country systematically.
The general picture is in accordance with the perception obtained from the media. The UK and the USA are not preferred targets of radical Islamic terrorism.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have estimated the probability of terrorist attacks being of a radical Islamic origin, given the attributes of the attack, for countries in Europe, the USA and Canada, using a mixed logit model and data referring to terrorist events for the period October 1979 to December 2002, obtained from the ITERATE data set. Taking into account the mixed logit, we conclude, first, that spatial heterogeneity related to Islamic terrorist attacks exists among countries analyzed, with such attacks being more prevalent in Switzerland, France and Italy and less prevalent in Germany, the UK and the USA. Second, attacks that result in assassination have a higher probability of being Islamic, while those resorting to bombs, arson, or armed attacks reduce this probability. Finally, we conclude that heterogeneity exists in the variable the number of casualties.
These results characterize the probability of terrorist attacks being Islamic as a function of the target country and the type of attack: What is the appropriate policy in this context? First, Switzerland, France and Italy should allocate more funds to counteract this type of terrorism. Second, the prevention and deterrence policies should take into account the evidence that, contrary to the Al Qaeda attacks, conventional Islamic attacks in Europe and North America rely more on assassination and less on bombs, arson or armed attacks. Policymakers and enforcers should also be aware that Islamic terrorists may cause more US victims outside the USA, though the statistical insignificance of the parameter of this variable when heterogeneity is taken into account (possibly due to a lack of precision) induces some caution on this conclusion. Third, the heterogeneity in casualties may mean that Islamic terrorist attacks can have very different results, ranging from high to low levels of this effect. This is the main result of the paper, and the policy implication is that adequate prevention and deterrence measures should always be in place, since the consequences in terms of casualties threatens to reach staggering proportions. Finally, the asymmetric targeting of the Islamic attacks of the different European countries means that a common European policy towards this threat will be difficult to achieve. Nevertheless, in the long run, according to the data set, it seems that we may expect the low frequency of terrorist activity in Western Europe and North America to be maintained, similar to that observed throughout most of the period studied. This possibility, very clearly, cannot allow the authorities and citizens to indulge in any degree of complacency or to relax their vigilance. Policies and strategies to counteract the phenomenon need to be permanently in place.
